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11	LOS ANGELES							
12	Γ OF CALIFORNIA							
13	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES							
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15	A CCOCIATIONI OF DEDITY DICTRICT	CASE NO. 21STCP03412						
	ASSOCIATION OF DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS FOR LOS ANGELES							
16	COUNTY (ADDA),	RESPONDENTS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STAY ALL						
17	Petitioner,	PROCEEDINGS AND DISCOVERY PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE						
18	v.	CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION APPEALS						
19	GEORGE GASCON, LOS ANGELES							
20	COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY; LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT							
21	ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,	Hearing Information						
22	Respondents.	DATE: January 14, 2021						
23		TIME: 9:30 a.m.						
24		LOCATION: Dept. 86, Stanley Mosl Courthouse, 111 N. Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012						
25		70012						
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TO THE HONORABLE COURT, THE PARTIES, AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 14, 2022, at 9:30am, or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department 86 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse, located at 111 N. Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, the Hon. Mitchell L. Beckloff, judge presiding, Respondents GEORGE GASCON, LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY; LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; and COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES will and hereby do move this court for a Court Order staying all proceedings, including discovery, in the above-captioned matter.

Respondents seek to stay all proceedings and discovery in this matter pending the outcome of the Civil Service Commission hearings on the petitions of nine (9) Deputy District Attorneys ("DDAs") who contest the transfers of attorneys Shelan Joseph, Tiffiny Blacknell, John Perroni, Nancy Theberge from the Public Defender's Office (and in the case of Gregory Apt, from the Alternate Public Defender's Office) to the District Attorney's Office.

Respondents move under Article IX, Sections 34 and 35 of the Los Angeles County

Charter, *Public Employees' Retirement System v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority*(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1046; *California Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist.* (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1489 and other similar California Court of Appeals cases¹

holding that Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission is an administrative agency subject to the administrative exhaustion rule and, therefore, denying writs of mandate on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

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¹ See, e.g., Board of Police Commissioners v. Superior Court (1985), 168 Cal.App.3d 420, 432 and Los Angeles Cty. Emps. Assn. v. Cty. Of Los Angeles (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 926, 934.

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Dated: December 21, 2021 SANDERS ROBERTS LLP

By:

Justin H. Sanders, Esq. Sabrina C. Narain, Esq. Shawn P. Thomas, Esq. Matthew Barzman, Esq. Attorneys for Respondents

Attorneys for Respondents
GEORGE GASCON; LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY; LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, AND COUNTY
OF LOS ANGELES

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. **INTRODUCTION**

This motion seeks an Order staying all proceedings and discovery in this matter on the grounds that Petitioner, Association of Deputy District Attorneys for Los Angeles County ("Petitioner" or "ADDA"), failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before the County of Los Angeles' Civil Service Commission (the "Commission") prior to commencing the present action in Superior Court. As of the date of this filing there are no fewer than nine (9) petitions filed by members of the ADDA pending before the Commission that will be heard on an expedited basis. Through those petitions, Petitioner contests the validity of, and appeals the transfer of five former Deputy Public Defenders (and one former Deputy Alternate Public Defender) to positions in the District Attorney's Office² where, Petitioner contends, other ADDA members were on the active eligibility lists for those positions.

The issues in those nine Commission appeals are precisely the same issues Petitioners seek to litigate in the present action: (1) whether the subject transfers were permissible under Civil Service Rule 15; and (2) whether the DA's Office violated Civil Service Rule 25 as to each appellant by not promoting them in favor of a public defender who got the job due to alleged political patronage. Declaration of Justin H. Sanders ("Sanders Decl.,") ¶ 12, Ex. 9: Petitioner's Status Conference Report (filed December 2, 2021). Thus, if the Court permits Petitioners to proceed with discovery and other litigation in this case, two duplicative actions involving the same facts and legal issues will be pending at the same time before two different tribunals. The failure to stay this case, therefore, would likely lead to conflicting and inconsistent rulings in two different legal proceedings.

Further, as explained more fully below, Petitioner cannot rely on the limited futility exception to the exhaustion rule. Petitioner's assertions that the Commission may render an

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² At issue are the transfers of attorneys Shelan Joseph, Tiffiny Blacknell, Nancy Theberge from Deputy Public Defender IV positions to Deputy District Attorney IV positions, Alisa Blair and John Perroni from Deputy Public Defender III positions to Deputy District Attorney III positions, and Gregory Apt from Deputy Alternate Public Defender IV (from the Alternate Public Defender's office) to District Attorney IV. Note that on December 1, 2021, the Commission considered and granted requests to amend the appeals to add the transfers of Mr. Perroni, Ms. Theberge, and Mr. Apt's (in addition to the previously plead complaints about the transfers of Ms. Joseph, Ms. Blacknell and Ms. Blair) as a basis for the appeals.

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inadequate remedy and/or that the administrative process would be futile are baseless. The California Court of Appeal already has ruled the Commission has the power and authority to fashion an adequate remedy in a similar matter. For example, in *Hudson v. City of Los Angeles* (2014) 232 Cal. App. 4th 392, 414, the Court of Appeal stated "Hudson's disability retirement did not divest the Civil Service Commission of authority to rule on her appeal from the Department's discharge of her employment, and to order her employment by the Department restored." Moreover, the Commission has not issued a formal ruling on any the appeals. Nor has the Commission stated how it would rule on those appeals. Consequently, the Court should stay the instant proceeding and related discovery until the appeals pending before the Commission are resolved conclusively.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 12, 2021, Deputy District Attorney Eric Siddall ("Mr. Siddall"), on behalf of himself and others, requested a hearing before the Commission, claiming that he was not hired in violation of the Civil Service Rules. Sanders Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, Exhibit 1: Mr. Siddall's Civil Service Commission appeal. On March 12, 2021, Deputy District Attorney Maria Ghobadi ("Ms. Ghobadi"), on behalf of herself and others, requested a hearing before the Commission, claiming that she was not promoted in violation of the Civil Service Rules. After the Commission ruled that Siddall could not proceed on behalf of others, Ms. Ghobadi agreed that she would drop her "class" claims. Sanders Decl. ¶¶ 2-4, Ex. 2: Ms. Ghobadi's Civil Service Commission appeal. Through the appeals, Mr. Siddall and Ms. Ghobadi contest the validity of the District Attorney's transfer of Tiffiny Blacknell and Shelan Joseph from Deputy Public Defender ("DPD") IV positions to Deputy District Attorney ("DDA") IV positions, and Alisa Blair from DPD III to DDA III while other ADDA members were on the active eligibility lists for consideration for promotion to the positions. Subsequently, Ms. Elizabeth Gibbons, counsel for Petitioner in this matter and for appellants before the Commission on the same matters, amended the appeals to contest the transfers of John Perroni from DPD III to DDA III, Nancy Theberge from DPD IV to DDA IV, and Greg Apt from Deputy Alternate Public Defender IV to DDA IV. *Sanders Decl.*, ¶ 12.

On July 21, 2021, the Commission granted a hearing on the first appeal, filed by Mr. Siddall.

Sanders Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 3: Commission Minutes Denying Consolidation and Approving Hearing.

Ms. Gibbons filed nine additional appeals between August and September 2021, each of which made similar or identical claims based on the same set of facts. *Sanders Decl.*, ¶ 6.

On October 12, 2021, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate seeking an injunction that would bar Respondents from hiring, transferring, or appointing any Deputy Public Defender to hold a position as a DDA II, III, IV, or V, to prevent the hiring of "unqualified" candidates; and enjoin Respondents to not take any action that would result in the expiration or invalidation of any existing eligible list until a replacement list is certified and published. *Sanders Decl.*, ¶7. Petitioner's complaint also requested temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief to prevent the hiring of additional DPDs as DDAs and to prevent the expiration of existing eligible lists until new lists are certified and published. *Id.* On October 15, 2021, the Los Angeles County Superior Court denied Petitioner's *ex parte* application for a temporary restraining order, and the Court set a hearing on an Order to Show Cause re: Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue (the "OSC") and provided a briefing schedule in the order. *Sanders Decl.*, ¶8, Ex. 5: October 15, 2021 Order Denying Ex Parte Relief and Setting OSC Hearing and Briefing Schedule.

After full briefing by both sides, the OSC went forward on November 10, 2021 before the Honorable Mitchell L. Beckloff. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court adopted its tentative ruling as the final Minute Order on the OSC. The Court's ruling was to deny Petitioner's application for a preliminary injunction. *Sanders Decl.*, ¶ 10-11, Ex. 7: Tentative Ruling Denying Preliminary Injunction and Ex. 8: Minute Order Denying Preliminary Injunction.

On December 1, 2021, the Commission moved forward with a procedural hearing on whether to grant hearings to all nine pending appeals by various DDAs (all are represented by Ms. Gibbons, Petitioner's counsel) claiming failure to promote based on a claim of a Civil Service Rule 25 violation and to determine whether the transfers were permissible under Civil Service Rule 15. *Sanders Decl.*, ¶ 12. The outcome of the December 1, 2021 hearing was that the Commission granted hearings to all nine DDAs who filed grievances, and ordered that all nine hearings are to held before a single hearing officer, and proceed on an expedited basis. *Ibid.* The Commission further ordered the hearings to be "coordinated," but not consolidated, meaning that there will be nine separate hearings assigned to a single hearing officer, and that hearing officer will have discretion on how to

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conduct/bifurcate the various appeals. *Ibid*. The issues in the hearings will be: (1) whether the subject transfers were permissible under Civil Service Rule 15; and (2) whether the DA's Office violated Civil Service Rule 25 as to each appellant by not promoting them in favor of a public defender who got the job due to alleged political patronage. *Ibid*.

On December 3, 2021, this Court held a status conference where Respondents moved to stay all proceedings and discovery. The court set a hearing on Respondents' motion to stay for January 14, 2022, with briefing to proceed under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005. *Sanders Decl.*, ¶ 13.

III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

Article IX, Sections 34 and 35 of the Los Angeles County Charter (the "Charter") created the Civil Service Commission and established it as the appellate body (see Charter Article IX, Section 34) vested with jurisdiction over petitions for "allegations of political discrimination and of discrimination based on race, sex, color national origin, religious opinions, or affiliations or handicap made by County employees, regardless of status, and by applicants for employment," Charter Article IX, Section 35.6. County Charter Article IX, Section 35.6 also gives the Commission jurisdiction over County employee appeals for discharges and reductions of permanent employees. Civil Service Rule 4.01 gives County employees a right to petition the Civil Service Commission for a hearing when the employee alleges that he or she is adversely affected by action or decision of the director of personnel concerning which discrimination is alleged as provided in Rule 25.³ The California Court of Appeals has held that the Civil Service Commission is an administrative agency subject to the administrative exhaustion rule and, therefore, has denied writs of mandate on the ground of failure to exhaust. See, e.g., Los Angeles Cty. Emps. Assn. v. Cty. Of Los Angeles (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 926, 934; see also Page v. Los Angeles Cty. Prob. Dep't, 123 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1141. Thus, the Civil Service Commission the final arbiter of claims by County employees alleging failure to promote.

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³ CSR 25.01 prohibits discrimination in County employment.

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A. The Exhaustion Doctrine Bars The Instant Writ Proceedings

The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies bars an action for injunctive relief that seeks to sidestep the exhaustion requirement. *Board of Police Commissioners v. Superior Court* (1985), 168 Cal.App.3d 420, 432; *See also* § 16:10, "Arguments that do not defeat exhaustion," 1 Cal. Affirmative Def. § 16:10 (2d ed.). Likewise, filing a petition for writ of mandate or other extraordinary writ does not avoid the exhaustion requirement. *See Hampson v. Superior Court* (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 472, 475-76; *see also Dixon v. Board of Trustees* (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1269, 1277-80; *see generally* 1 Cal. Affirmative Def. § 16:10 (2d ed.) § 16:10, "Arguments that do not defeat exhaustion."

When relief via traditional mandamus is sought, the exhaustion requirement speaks to whether there exists an adequate legal remedy. If an administrative remedy is available and has not yet been exhausted, the petition is not entitled to extraordinary relief. A remedy will not be deemed inadequate merely because additional time and effort would be consumed by its being pursued through the ordinary course of law. *Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees of Saint Agnes Medical Center* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 607, 620. "Inconvenience does not equal irreparable injury." (*Ibid.*)

1. Petitioner Has Not Exhausted Its Administrative Remedies Because

Petitioner Has Not Proceeded Through the Full Administrative Process to
a Final Decision on the Merits

"Generally, 'a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts . . ." Hill RHF Housing Partners, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 51 Cal.App.4th 621, 631 [citations omitted]. "The exhaustion doctrine is principally grounded on concerns favoring administrative autonomy (i.e., courts should not interfere with an agency determination until the agency has reached a final decision) and judicial efficiency (i.e., overworked courts should decline to intervene in an administrative dispute unless absolutely necessary)." Id. at 632 [quoting Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 391].)

The exhaustion inquiry looks not just at the concreteness of the controversy, but at whether the parties have proceeded "through the full administrative process 'to a final decision on the

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merits." California Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1489 [citation omitted].) "Under California law, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a matter of judicial discretion but is a jurisdictional rule of procedure that forecloses judicial review until it is satisfied." Public Employees' Retirement System v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1046.

As noted, "[t]he principal purposes of exhaustion requirements include avoidance of premature interruption of administrative processes, allowing an agency to develop the necessary factual background of the case; letting the agency apply its expertise and exercise its statutory discretion, and administrative efficiency and judicial economy." California Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at 1489.

Exhaustion⁴ is required for both traditional mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure § 1085 and administrative mandamus under § 1094.5. See Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1085, 1094.5; See Coastside Fishing Club v. California Fish and Game Comm'n (2013) 215 Cal. App. 4th 397, following SJCBC, LLC v. Horwedel (2010) 201 Cal. App. 4th 339, 346; City of Sacramento v. State Water Resources Control Board (1992) 2 Cal. App. 4th 960, 969; Bollengier v. Doctors Medical Center (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1125 [citations omitted].

A plaintiff aggrieved by an administrative decision must also exhaust any available, nonduplicative administrative review procedures before challenging the decision in court. City of Fillmore v Board of Equalization (2011) 194 Cal. App. 4th 716, 725 (exhaustion of remedies doctrine encompasses both requirements). The issues pending before the Commission in the nine specified appeals are precisely the same issues Petitioners seek to litigate in the present action. Thus, if the Court permits Petitioners to proceed with discovery and other litigation in this case, two duplicative actions involving the same facts and legal issues will be pending at the same time before two different tribunals. As noted above, the Commission scheduled the hearings on an expedited basis.

27 Cal.App.4th 788, 795.

⁴ "[A]n order of an administrative agency attains administrative finality when the agency has exhausted its jurisdiction and possesses no further power to reconsider or rehear the claim." Lomeli v. Department of Corrections (2003) 108

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The Commission has not issued a final ruling yet. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not exhausted the administrative review procedure in this case.

2. The Futility Exception Does Not Apply Here Because the Commission Has Not Announced Its Position on any of Petitioner's Appeals

Petitioner's may attempt to argue that pursuing the nine appeals before the Commission is "futile." However, Petitioner's claim that the futility exception applies lacks merit. First, it is belied by Petitioner's own admission that the Commission hearings have been coordinated with a single hearing officer and are proceeding on an expedited basis. Sanders Decl., ¶¶ 12-13, **Ex. 9**: Petitioner's December 2, 2021 Status Conference Report, (see page 1, lines 25-28, page 2, lines 1-4 therein)⁵; Ex. 10: Respondents' Status Conference Report. Next, the futility exception "is a very narrow one." City of Contra Costa v. State of California (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 62, 77. The futility doctrine may only be invoked in the context of an administrative remedy if the party invoking the exception "can positively state that the [agency] has declared what its ruling will be on a particular case." *Jonathan* Neil & Assoc., Inc. v. Jones (2004) 33 Cal.4th 917, 936 (citing Sea & Sage Audubon Society, Inc. v. Planning Comm. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 418).

To this end, Courts have found the exhaustion requirement to have been met only where (1) an agency has already rejected a claim; (2) announced its position on a claim; or (3) made clear that it would not consider the petitioner's evidence. See Farahani v. San Diego Community College Dist., 175 Cal. App. 4th 1486, 1497 (2009) (citing Doster v. County of San Diego, 203 Cal. App. 3d 257, 260-261 (1988)). Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 only allows judicial review of final administrative proceedings in writ of mandate cases. See also Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees of Saint Agnes Medical Center (2001) 93 Cal. App. 4th 607, 620-621.

Petitioner previously argued that any appeal before the Commission is futile because Petitioner believes the Commission will "likely" find that it lacks jurisdiction to reinstate the Ms. Blacknell, Ms. Joseph and Ms. Blair back to the Public Defender's Office if new hires already

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⁵ Petitioner's own Status Conference Report to this Court stated that the Commission (1) granted hearings for all nine individual DDAs who have filed appeals; (2) considered amendments thereto; (3) ordered that the hearings be coordinated before a single hearing officer; and (4) ordered that the hearings be expedited.

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have filled their former respective positions. Declaration of Elizabeth Gibbons in Support of Request for Preliminary Injunction, ¶ 18-19. However, Civil Service Rule 4.13 gives the Commission discretion to fashion remedies to appeals within its jurisdiction. See CSR Rule 4.13. These remedies can include reinstatement, suspension, or discharge of a County officer or employee. See Los Angeles County Charter, Art. IX, § 34; CSR 4.14. If County employees are not satisfied with the outcome, they may seek judicial review of those decisions only after the Commission renders its final decision. See CSR 4.14. Here, the Commission has not stated what its ruling will be; indeed, the Commission has indicated only that it will hear Petitioner's appeals on an expedited basis. Sanders Decl., ¶ 12. Each of the appeals contesting the transfer of Ms. Joseph, Ms. Blacknell, Mr. Perroni, Ms. Theberge and Mr. Apt are moving efficiently through the Commission appeal process. At the status conference before this court on December 3, 2021, Petitioners' counsel herself acknowledged the nine hearings on the DDA claims would proceed in early 2022. Thus, the administrative review process is underway and no decisions by the Commission have been preemptively made, effectively precluding Petitioner from invoking the futility exception. This Court cannot possibly determine that there is no adequate remedy available to Petitioner because the Court has nothing before it to suggest how the Commission might remedy any violation it might find.

B. A Stay of Writ Proceedings and Related Discovery is Appropriate Here

"[A] court ordinarily has inherent power, in its discretion, to stay proceedings when such a stay will accommodate the ends of justice." *People v. Bell* (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 323, 329. As the court in *Landis v. North American Co.* (1936) 299 U.S. 248, 254, explained, "the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." *OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho* (2019) 8 Cal. 5th 111, 141 cert. denied sub nom. *OTO, L.L.C. v. Ken Kho*, 141 S. Ct. 85, 207 L. Ed. 2d 170 (2020). Here, Article IX, Sections 34 and 35 of the County Charter created the Civil Service Commission as the appellate body (see Charter Article IX, Section 34) vested with jurisdiction over appeals for "allegations of political discrimination and of discrimination based on race, sex, color national origin, religious opinions, or affiliations

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or handicap made by County employees, regardless of status, and by applicants for employment," (Charter Article IX, Section 35.6). Charter Article IX, Section 35.6 gives the Commission jurisdiction over County employee appeals for discharges and reductions of permanent employees, and given that Civil Service Rule 4.01 provides that County employees are to petition the Civil Service Commission for a hearing when the employee alleges that he or she is adversely affected by action or decision of the director of personnel concerning which discrimination is alleged (as provided in Civil Service Rule 25). Given that Petitioners are actively pursuing their employment claims before the Commission, it is clear that the administrative process (as established by municipal legislation) must be respected. Thus, if the Court permits Petitioners to proceed with discovery and other litigation in this case, two duplicative actions involving the same facts and legal issues will be pending at the same time before two different tribunals. The failure to stay this case, therefore, would likely lead to conflicting and inconsistent rulings in two different legal proceedings, and the two parallel actions would unnecessarily tax court and party resources. This also creates a floodgates problem here: if this court were to allow Petitioners to sidestep the administrative proceedings before the Commission, it would effectively undermine the Commission's power and authority, and would incentivize other putative plaintiffs or petitioners to prosecute claims in State Court that should be heard before the Commission under Los Angeles County rules.

1. Discovery in the ADDA v. Gascon Writ Proceedings Undermines the Administrative Exhaustion Requirement And Should Be Stayed

Permitting discovery to proceed in this matter would effectively eliminate the administrative exhaustion requirement by undermining all of the reasons why it exists in the first place. Where there is an adequate administrative remedy available and there is no admissible evidence to suggest that Petitioner's attempt to seek that remedy will be futile, this Court should not permit Petitioner to sidestep the exhaustion requirement and proceed with litigation in Superior Court. Doing so would embody the administrative inefficiency and failure of judicial economy that the exhaustion rule exists to prevent. Furthermore, it would increase the risk that this Court would be called upon to rule on issues before the Commission when the Commission has

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not yet had an opportunity to rule on those issues itself. The administrative exhaustion rule is not a mere legal nicety; strictly enforcing it here will prevent conflicting rulings and promote efficiency and judicial economy as the framers of the rule envisioned.

2. The Civil Service Commission Has the Power and Authority to Fashion a Remedy Here

Petitioner's conclusory argument that the administrative process here is futile is mere speculation unsupported by legal authority. See, e.g., Gibbons Decl. in Support of Petitioner's Request for Preliminary Injunction, ¶ 18-19. In short, Petitioner claims that the Commission does not have jurisdiction or authority to issue a meaningful remedy here, and argues any remedy it may receive from the Commission is inadequate. *Ibid*. Consequently, Petitioner asserts it is not required to exhaust its administrative remedies to obtain judicial intervention, citing Edgren v. Regents of University of California (1984) 158 Cal. App. 3d 515, 521 [exhaustion may be excused when party claims "the agency lacks authority, statutory or otherwise, to resolve the underlying dispute between the parties"]. However, Plaintiff's reliance on Edgren v. Regents of University of California, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at 521, along with Zuniga v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1255 and County of Los Angeles Dept. Of Health Services v. Civil Service Com. Of County of Los Angeles (Latham) 180 Cal.App.4th 391 in support of its futility argument is misplaced.

In Hudson v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 232 Cal. App. 4th 392, the Court of Appeal, Second District, specifically addressed Zuniga and Latham. In Hudson, the Court found the Commission does have the power to craft remedies to reinstate County employees to their prior employment, including the remedy of ordering former employment restored. "Hudson's disability retirement did not divest the Civil Service Commission of authority to rule on her appeal from the Department's discharge of her employment, and to order her employment by the Department restored." *Hudson*, 232 Cal. App. 4th at 414. Thus the Commission has the authority to provide final and complete relief to Petitioner if the Commission finds the transfers were somehow improper (though, to be sure, the transfers were not). Consequently, the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement has not been met, and as described further below, the futility

exception to the administrative exhaustion requirement does not apply here.

IV. **CONCLUSION**

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Since Petitioner's appeals are still pending before the Commission, and the nine individual hearings have not yet been held, the Commission has not yet been provided with the opportunity to hear Petitioner's claims, determine if there were any violations of the Civil Service Rules, and if so, fashion a remedy. Nor has the Commission stated how it would rule on those appeals. Consequently, Petitioner's claims that the Commission may render an inadequate remedy and/or that the administrative process would be futile are pure speculation under these circumstances. Until the Commission finally considers the matter Petitioner has not exhausted its administrative remedies, it is premature for this Court to interpret the Civil Service Rules and the Commission's application of those rules at the present time. Because administrative exhaustion is mandatory prior to judicial review, this action and related discovery must be stayed until the Commission has had an opportunity to do so. For each of the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request the Court grant this motion to stay all proceedings and discovery in this matter.

LOS ANGELES, CA 90017

Dated: December 21, 2021

SANDERS ROBERTS LLP

Justin H. Sanders, Esq. Sabrina C. Narain, Esq. Shawn P. Thomas, Esq. Matthew Barzman, Esq. Attorneys for Respondents

GEORGE GASCON; LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY: LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT AND COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

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DISCOVERY PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION APPEALS

SANDERS ROBERTS

LOS ANGELES, CA 90017

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I, Blanca Reyes am a citizen of the United States, over 18 years of age and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 1055 W. 7th Street, Suite 3200, Los Angeles, CA 90017, which is located in the County of Los Angeles where the service took place. My electronic service address is: breyes@sandersroberts.com.

On December 21 2021 I served the foregoing document(s) described as:

RESPONDENTS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS AND DISCOVERY PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION APPEALS

in a s	on all interested parties in this action by placing a true and correct copy thereof enclosed ealed envelope addressed as stated in the attached service list:
	<u>VIA MAIL</u> I am readily familiar with this office's practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the U.S. Postal Service. Per that practice the within correspondence will be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on the same day shown on this affidavit in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business.
	<u>VIA FACSIMILE</u> I caused such document to be transmitted via facsimile to the addressee(s) from the facsimile machine of Sanders Roberts LLP whose fax number is (213) 234-4581. No error was reported by the machine and pursuant to Rule 2008(e)(3), I caused the machine to print a record of the transmission.
	<u>VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL</u> I caused a PDF version of the documents to be transmitted by electronic mail to the party(s) identified on the attached service list using the e-mail address(es) indicated, per their stipulation. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission(s) were unsuccessful.
	<u>VIA PERSONAL SERVICE</u> I caused such envelope(s) to be delivered by a process server employed by Express Network the attached documents to the office(s) of the addressee.
	<u>VIA OVERNIGHT DELIVERY (FEDERAL EXPRESS)</u> I caused the attached document(s) to be delivered via overnight delivery to the recipients shown on the attached service list.
Decei	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on mber 21, 2021, at Los Angeles, California.
	/s/Blanca Reyes Blanca Reyes

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

SERVICE LIST

ADDA vs. George Gascon, et al.

LASC - Case No.: 21STCP03412

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